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Patterns of civilian and child deaths due to war-related 
violence in Syria: a comparative analysis from the Violation 
Documentation Center dataset, 2011–16
Debarati Guha-Sapir, Benjamin Schlüter, Jose Manuel Rodriguez-Llanes, Louis Lillywhite, Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks
Summary
Background Since March, 2011, the Syrian civil war has lowered life expectancy by as much as 20 years. We describe 
demographic, spatial, and temporal patterns of direct deaths of civilians and opposition combatants from conflict-
related violence in 6 years of war.
Methods We analysed conflict-related violent deaths with complete information on date, place, and cause of death and 
demographic group occurring from March 18, 2011, to Dec 31, 2016, recorded by the Violation Documentation 
Center (VDC). We included civilian and combatant deaths in all Syrian governorates, excluding government-controlled 
areas. We did not include detainees and missing persons, nor deaths from siege conditions or insufficient medical care. 
We categorised deaths based on VDC weapon type. We used χ² testing to compare deaths from different weapons in 
civilian men, women, boys, and girls and adult and child combatants. We analysed deaths by governorate and over time.
Findings The VDC recorded 143 630 conflict-related violent deaths with complete information between March 18, 2011, 
and Dec 31, 2016. Syrian civilians constituted 101 453 (70·6%) of the deaths compared with 42 177 (29·4%) opposition 
combatants. Direct deaths were caused by wide-area weapons of shelling and air bombardments in 58 099 (57·3%) 
civilians, including 8285 (74·6%) civilian women and 13 810 (79·4%) civilian children, and in 4058 (9·6%) opposition 
combatants. Proportions of children among civilian deaths increased from 8·9% (388 of 4354 civilian deaths) in 2011 
to 19·0% (4927 of 25 972) in 2013 and to 23·3% (2662 of 11 444) in 2016. Of 7566 deaths from barrel bombs, 7351 (97·2%) 
were civilians, of whom 2007 (27·3%) were children. Of 20 281 deaths by execution, 18 747 (92·4%) were civilians and 
1534 (7·6%) were opposition combatants. Compared with opposition child soldiers who were male (n=333), deaths of 
civilian male children (n=11 730) were caused more often by air bombardments (39·2% vs 5·4%, p<0·0001) and 
shelling (37·3% vs 13·2%, p<0·0001) and less often by shooting (12·5% vs 76·0%, p<0·0001).
Interpretation Aerial bombing and shelling rapidly became primary causes of direct deaths of women and children and 
had disproportionate lethal effects on civilians, calling into question the use of wide-area explosive weapons in urban 
areas. Increased reliance on aerial bombing by the Syrian Government and international partners is likely to have 
contributed to findings that children were killed in increasing proportions over time, ultimately comprising a quarter of 
civilian deaths in 2016. The inordinate proportion of civilians among the executed is consistent with deliberate tactics to 
terrorise civilians. Deaths from barrel bombs were overwhelmingly civilian rather than opposition combatants, suggesting 
indiscriminate or targeted warfare contrary to international humanitarian law and possibly constituting a war crime.
Funding None.
Copyright © The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. 
Introduction
The Syrian conflict started in March, 2011, with peaceful 
demonstrations. By June, 2011, these had escalated into 
an armed rebellion against President Bashar Al-Assad 
and his government that involved a spectrum of anti-
government factions including Salafi jihadist groups, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the mostly 
Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, and a more moderate 
Free Syrian Army. Warring parties in Syria have since 
proliferated to include additional jihadist groups, Russian 
air forces, US-led coalition air forces, and Iranian, 
Palestinian, Russian, and coalition special forces.
The continuing civil war has displaced over half the 
population. By late 2016, 6·3 million Syrians were 
internally displaced, with an estimated 6100 newly 
displaced people daily.1 Over 1 million fled to Europe2 and 
an additional 5 million are refugees living in neighbouring 
countries,1 of whom 2·4 million are children.3 Among 
Syrians unable to escape the violence, over 1 million have 
been injured and hundreds of thousands have died from 
indirect and direct effects of war, resulting in a drop in life 
expectancy of up to 20 years by 2014.4 Indirect deaths from 
the conflict arise for many reasons including increased 
disease and severe shortages of medical staff, supplies, 
and access to facilities.1,5–8 Direct conflict deaths are from 
injuries inflicted by violent methods used by warring 
parties. The aim of this study was to describe demographic, 
spatial, and temporal patterns of direct deaths of civilians 
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and opposition combatants from conflict-related violence 
during the first 6 years of the Syrian war.
Methods
Data source
Staff at the Violation Documentation Center (VDC) gave 
permission to the authors to use VDC data. The VDC is 
a non-profit non-governmental organisation registered 
in Switzerland that tracks and documents human rights 
violations from the armed conflict in Syria dating from 
March 18, 2011, including war-related deaths and 
missing and detained people. The VDC applies 
international standards for docu mentation of human 
rights violations. When the group formed in April, 2011, 
it retrospectively added data starting from March 18, 2011, 
and subsequently compiled data on conflict-related 
deaths on a daily basis. To ensure inde pendence and 
neutrality, the VDC only accepts funding from 
independent, unbiased, or neutral entities. The VDC 
was founded by Razan Zeitouna, a human rights lawyer 
who was subsequently kidnapped with her husband and 
two other VDC staff members in January, 2013, in Duma, 
Syria. Since then, VDC has been led by a group of 
administrators inside and outside of Syria (initially 
in Turkey and then Switzerland) and two database 
managers. Depending on the period, the VDC has a 
team of about 30–35 investigators and a ground network 
covering every governorate consisting of more than 
30 internationally trained field reporters, who collect 
data in three steps. First, initial information on one or 
more victims is gathered, mainly from hospitals, 
morgues, relatives of the victims, and media sources. 
Second, the initial report is further confirmed, when 
possible, by supporting information on victims such as 
videos or photographs. Third, once the record has been 
established, key information missing on victims is 
actively investigated until completion of record. For each 
death, the record consists in demographics, date, 
location, cause of death, and civilian versus combatant 
status (with combatant defined as any member of the 
government, opposition, or non-state armed groups). 
The VDC compiles information on every death captured 
by its ground-reporting network. Its registries are 
verified daily and updated with new information. Data 
are available in both Arabic and English.
The VDC gathers information on conflict-related violent 
deaths from all governorates in Syria, regardless of the 
perpetrator of the violation. It does not claim to be fully 
exhaustive; in particular, information on victims in 
government-controlled areas can be difficult to obtain 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed, Scopus, and Google Scholar using a wide 
array of combinations including the terms “mortality”, “death”, 
“lethal”, “autopsy”, “casualty”, “violence”, “Syria”, “war”, 
and “conflict” for reports published before March 6, 2017. 
We scrutinised 457 article titles and abstracts and downloaded 
62 full papers, which included 47 academic and 15 white papers 
and reports. We examined reference lists for additional sources. 
Most reports were published by international organisations, 
such as the UN, UNICEF, Human Rights Watch, Physicians for 
Human Rights, and the Oxford Research Group. These reports 
focused primarily on human rights violations against civilians 
involving the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, 
chemical weapons, barrel bombs, execution, and targeted 
attacks on schools and hospitals. The medical literature primarily 
described attacks on medical facilities and medical personnel 
and injury profiles. Specific methods of war used in Syria were 
analysed in one paper through the lens of international 
humanitarian law. Several small studies described conflict-
related deaths and injuries of Syrians who reached medical 
facilities in Turkey. We previously reported the effect of weapons 
causing 78 769 Syrian civilian direct deaths up to January, 2015, 
with a focus on vulnerable demographic groups. 
Added value of this study
This study makes use of the systematic recording of violent 
deaths from the Syrian civil war by the Violation 
Documentation Center over 6 years of conflict to provide 
a systematic analysis of civilian and opposition combatant 
violent deaths, their demographic characteristics, the causative 
method or weapon, and spatial and temporal patterns of direct 
deaths during the conflict. We relate patterns and causes of 
death to possible violations of international humanitarian law. 
Implications of all the available evidence
This study shows that the Syrian civil war saw a shift to the 
systematic use of air bombardments, including barrel bombs, 
on populated areas. This caused increasingly high proportions 
of deaths of civilian women and children over the 6 years 
of conflict, which is arguably disproportionate and thus contrary 
to international humanitarian law. Deaths of children from air 
bombardments were increasingly concentrated in Aleppo over 
6 years. By the end of 2016, one in four Syrian civilians killed 
by barrel bombs was a child. Cause of death of child soldiers 
differed significantly from that of child civilians and adult 
combatants. Civilian men were disproportionately represented 
among those executed and tortured, which supports allegations 
of a policy of targeting civilians as a means of conducting the war, 
contrary to international humanitarian law. The relatively small 
effect of wide-area weapons against combatants, together with 
their disproportionate effect on civilians, calls into question the 
use of such weapons in urban conflicts containing a large civilian 
population. Use of explosive weapons might minimise deaths 
among combatants but do so at a disproportionate cost in civilian 
deaths. Therefore, forces fighting in urban areas should employ 
tactics carefully to comply with international humanitarian law.
For more on the Violation 
Documentation Center see 
http://vdc-sy.net/en/
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because these areas are often not safely accessible to VDC 
staff. Therefore, we chose not to include data from 
government-controlled areas, contained in the so-called 
regime fatalities dataset, because of the uncertainties in 
the dataset (ie, key missing information in available 
records and few data from recent years). Instead, we 
analysed data from non-government-controlled areas; 
these data are contained in the so-called martyrs dataset 
and describe deaths of civilians and non-government 
combatants in non-government-controlled areas. The 
VDC identified combatant deaths by an iterative process 
including multiple sources of information and validation 
as described above. Further details on the VDC datasets 
and data collection are described in our previous paper9 on 
Syrian civilian deaths. We defined children as individuals 
younger than 18 years of age, consistent with the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.10
The Ethical Board of the Université catholique de 
Louvain advised that informed consent was not required 
for analysis of these mortality data collected for purposes 
other than this study and in the public domain.
Data analysis
We included all conflict-related, direct violent deaths 
occurring from March 18, 2011, to Dec 31, 2016, with 
complete information on date, place (listed as “Province” 
in the database), and cause of death and demographic 
group (men, women, male children, or female children). 
Our analysis only included deaths from the killed dataset, 
and did not include detainees or missing persons. We did 
not include deaths from siege conditions (eg, starvation) 
or inability to seek medical care.
We categorised weapons based on VDC weapon types. 
Shelling comprised artillery, tanks, mortars, rocket 
launchers, ground-launched missiles, and shells. Ground-
level explosives comprised improvised explosive devices 
such as suicide bombs, vehicle bombs, and roadside 
bombs; landmines; explosive remnants; grenades; 
explosive booby-traps; and unidentified ground-level 
explosives not delivered by a plane or helicopter. Chemical 
weapons were toxic substances delivered in any form. 
Shooting comprised handheld small arms, machine guns, 
and snipers. VDC deaths by execution in the field or after 
detention or abduction, with and without torture, were 
collapsed into one execution category, although we also 
analysed use of torture before execution separately. We 
categorised VDC warplanes as air bombardments because 
they included not only aeroplane-delivered explosives but 
also barrel bombs dropped by helicopters and aeroplanes. 
Barrel bombs are improvised, frag menting explosives, 
made of barrels or cylinders filled with explosives, 
shrapnel, nails, and oil. They weigh approximately 90 kg to 
900 kg and fragment on impact into a large blast radius 
capable of decimating a city block.11 We searched the note 
section of air bombardment records for the term “barrel” 
to identify direct deaths from barrel bombs in the Syrian 
conflict.
We used χ² tests to compare demographic group 
(ie, civilian vs combatant, adult vs child, male vs female). 
Additionally, we provide descriptive statistics on cause of 
death by weapons type. We used R software (version 3.3.2) 
to calculate proportions and χ² testing. All p values are 
two-tailed with one degree of freedom and α=0·05.
Role of the funding source
No funding was received for this study. All authors had 
full access to all the data and are jointly responsible for 
the decision to submit for publication.
Results
The VDC recorded 145 849 deaths in non-government-
controlled areas from March 18, 2011, to Dec 31, 2016. 
We excluded 2219 deaths due to unspecified cause of 
death (n=1354), missing location (n=558), missing or 
erroneous data (n=73), and death by siege (n=23) or in-
sufficient medical care (n=211), resulting in a dataset of 
143 630 deaths with complete information on date and 
place of death, demographic group, civilian or combatant 
status, and cause of violent death. Approximately 99% of 
combatants had information on their military rank or 
armed group and were all affiliated with opposition 
groups; the remaining 1% were of unknown affiliation. 
Civilians constituted 70·6% (n=101 453) of violent deaths 
from conflict, and opposition combatants constituted 
29·4% (n=42 177; table). Among the civilians killed, 
72 940 (71·9%) were men, 11 112 (11·0%) were women, 
and 17 401 (17·2%) were children. Violent deaths of 
civilian men were caused in almost equal proportions by 
shelling, shooting, executions, and aerial bombardments 
(table). Civilian women were killed primarily by wide-area 
weapons of shelling and air bombardments, as were 
civilian children (table). In all, more than half (58 099, 
57·3%) of civilian deaths from conflict violence resulted 
from wide-area explosive weapons, with 29 983 (29·6%) 
caused by shelling and 28 116 (27·7%) by air bom-
bardments, and 20 372 (20·0%) deaths resulted from 
shooting. By comparison, only 9·6% of opposition 
combatant deaths resulted from wide-area explosives 
(2870 [6·8%] by shelling and 1188 [2·8%] by air 
bombardments), whereas 35 416 (84·0%) died from 
shooting (table). Among opposition combatants, 99·2% of 
those killed were men, 0·8% were boys, and 0·01% were 
women (table).
Almost all of the 7566 deaths from barrel bombs were 
civilians (7351, 97·2%), of which more than a quarter were 
children (2007, 27·3%; table). The proportion of civilian 
children who died from aerial bombardments with barrel 
bombs was nearly twice that of civilian men (p<0·0001; 
table). Among civilians killed by barrel bombs, women 
were significantly over-represented compared with men 
(p<0·0001; table). Civilian deaths from barrel bombs were 
concentrated in time, with 5322 (72·4%) occurring in the 
18 months from Jan 1, 2014, to June 30, 2015. 4820 (65·6%) 
civilian deaths from barrel bombs occurred in Aleppo, 
For the regime fatalities 
dataset see http://www.vdc-sy.
info/index.php/en/
otherstatistics
For the martyrs dataset see 
http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.
php/en/martyrs
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794 (10·8%) in Daraa, and 664 (9·0%) in Idlib. Nearly two 
thirds of all child deaths from barrel bombs occurred 
in Aleppo (1264, 63·0%), where more than a quarter 
(26·2%) of civilians killed by barrel bombs were children. 
Of all child deaths from barrel bombs, 285 (14·2%) 
occurred in Daraa and 172 (8·6%) in Idlib, comprising 
35·9% and 25·9%, respectively, of civilian deaths by barrel 
bombs in those areas.
Of 20 281 deaths by execution, 18 747 (92·4%) were 
civilians and 1534 (7·6%) were opposition combatants 
(table). Among civilian men, nearly a quarter were killed 
by execution compared with 3·7% of adult male oppo-
sition combatants (p<0·0001; table). Among civilian men 
killed by execution, 7237 (42·5%) were tortured before 
execution compared with 411 (26·9%) executed adult 
male combatants (p<0·0001). Executed civilian men were 
subjected to torture significantly more often than were 
executed civilian women (vs 65 [8·1%]; p<0·0001) and 
children (vs 124 [13·4%]; p<0·0001). Executed civilian 
children were subjected to torture significantly more 
often than were executed civilian women (p<0·0001).
The Syrian conflict claimed an increasing proportion of 
children among civilian deaths as fighting continued, up to 
and including 2016 (figure 1). At the beginning of the 
conflict (ie, until the end of 2011), children composed 
8·9% (n=388) of all 4354 civilian deaths; in 2013, they 
composed 19·0% (n=4927) of 25 972 civilian deaths that 
year; and by Dec 31, 2016, they composed 23·3% (n=2662) 
of 11 444 civilian deaths that year, increasing by 
14·4 percentage points over the 6 years. The proportion of 
adult female deaths more than quadrupled during 
this period, rising from 3·4% (146 deaths) in 2011 to 13·8% 
(1582 deaths) by the end of 2016 (figure 1). Throughout the 
conflict, the pro portion of deaths among children has 
been higher than the proportion of deaths among women, 
and the gap between these two proportions reached its 
maximum, nearly 10·0 percentage points, by 2016 (figure 1).
In the first 2 years of the war, the single-target method of 
shooting caused most civilian deaths (figure 2). In early 
2013, shelling became the predominant cause of civilian 
death and rapidly escalated. Civilian deaths from air 
bombardments were initially low until August, 2012, 
when they accelerated rapidly, causing air bombardments 
to become the second greatest cause of civilian violent 
death by the end of 2016. By this point, 44 289 (52·7%) of 
all adult civilian violent deaths had resulted from wide-area 
explosive weapons, with 23 405 (27·8%) of all deaths 
caused by shelling and 20 884 (24·8%) by air bombard-
ments (table).
Patterns of death differed substantially between 
demographic groups, changing over the period of the 
conflict. Civilian men died mostly from shooting from 
March, 2011, to January, 2014, after which point most died 
from shelling (figure 2). By contrast, the primary cause of 
violent deaths of civilian women and children shifted 
from shooting to shelling earlier in the conflict, beginning 
in August, 2012 (figure 2). Air bombardment deaths of 
women and children increased more rapidly than among 
men, becoming the leading cause of death for civilian 
women and children by September, 2016. By the end of 
2016, 22 095 (77·5%) of 28 513 civilian women and children 
Civilian Combatant
Adult, male Adult, female Child, male Child, female Adult, male Child, male
Shelling 19 216 (26·3%) 4189 (37·7%) 4381 (37·3%) 2197 (38·7%) 2826 (6·8%) 44 (13·2%)
Shooting 17 026 (23·3%) 1445 (13·0%) 1466 (12·5%) 435 (7·7%) 35 163 (84·0%) 253 (76·0%)
Executions 17 025 (23·3%) 798 (7·2%) 714 (6·1%) 210 (3·7%) 1528 (3·7%) 6 (1·8%)
Air bombardments 16 788 (23·0%) 4096 (36·9%) 4604 (39·2%) 2628 (46·3%) 1170 (2·8%) 18 (5.4%)
Barrel bomb explosives 4253 (5·8%) 1091 (9·8%) 1274 (10·9%) 733 (12·9%) 211 (0·5%) 4 (1·2%)
Ground-level explosives 2311 (3·2%) 282 (2·5%) 489 (4·2%) 142 (2·5%) 1063 (2·5%) 12 (3·6%)
Chemical weapons 574 (0·8%) 302 (2·7%) 76 (0·6%) 59 (1·0%) 88 (0·2%) 0
Total 72 940 11 112 11 730 5671 41 838 333
This table does not show the six adult female combatants whose deaths are included in the study dataset (one by shooting; two by air bombardments, of which one by barrel 
bomb explosives; and three by ground-level explosives). No child female combatants were recorded. 
Table: Cause of violent death of Syrian civilians and opposition combatants, 2011–16
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Figure 1: Proportion of civilian violent deaths composed of women and of 
children in years 2011–16 of the Syrian conflict
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killed had resulted from wide-area explosive weapons, 
with 10 767 (37·8%) of all deaths caused by shelling and 
11 328 (39·7%) caused by air bombardments (table).
The greatest numbers of civilian violent deaths were 
documented in Homs until late 2012; at this point, Homs 
was overtaken by Damascus suburbs and Aleppo, which 
each witnessed nearly 25% of all deaths (figure 3). The 
highest proportions of civilian child deaths by shelling 
occurred substantially and consistently in Aleppo and in 
Damascus (figure 3). Over 40% of child deaths by air 
bombardment were concentrated in Aleppo. This 
proportion escalated in 2013, reaching over twice that of 
other governorates (figure 3).
A greater proportion of civilian male children died 
from air bombardments and from shelling than did 
child combatants (both p<0·0001; table), whereas a 
greater proportion of child combatants died from 
shooting than did civilian male children (p<0·0001; 
table). Shooting was the most frequent cause of death of 
child and adult combatants (table). Compared with adult 
combatants, child combatants were more likely to die 
from shelling (p<0·0001) and from air bombardments 
(p<0·0069). Child combatant deaths documented by the 
VDC were distributed in multiple governorates, mostly 
in Aleppo (101 [30%] deaths) and Damascus suburbs 
(55 [17%] deaths). Of 327 child opposition combatants of 
known affiliation, 290 (89%) were associated with the 
Free Syrian Army, 24 (7%) with ISIL, and small 
percentages with other groups. Of 292 child combatants 
of known age, 241 (83%) were 16–17 years of age. 
However, violent deaths of child combatants as young as 
11 years of age were documented.
Discussion
Our study shows that 70% of direct violent deaths of 
civilians or opposition combatants in the first 6 years of the 
Syrian civil war were civilians. The total number of direct 
conflict deaths of men in Syria substantially exceeded that 
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Figure 2: Civilian deaths by weapon type and demographic group
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of women, which is consistent with the greater loss of life 
expectancy of male Syrians than of female Syrians that was 
primarily attributed to war violence, as shown by the 
Global Burden of Disease Study.12 We found shifts in cause 
and location of death that reflected the path of the Syrian 
war. Shootings, summary executions, grenades, and 
ground-launched shells initially character ised both 
government and rebel forces. Aerial bombard ments were 
then initiated by the Syrian Government and intensified 
with the entry of inter national powers including the US-
led coalition in 2014 and Russian forces in 2015. Consistent 
with this trajectory of war, our analysis shows that most 
civilians were killed by shooting in the first 2 years, after 
which shelling became the predominant cause of civilian 
death, accompanied by a rapid increase in deaths from air 
bombardments from 2012 until the end of 2016. 
Approximately three quarters of recorded incidents of 
explosive weapon use in Syria have occurred in densely 
populated civilian areas, putting civilians at very high risk 
and suggesting a degree of intentionality.5,13,14
Most notable among our findings was the relatively 
minimal effect of wide-area explosive weapons on 
opposition combatants in the Syrian conflict. The 
proportion of civilian deaths by wide-area explosives was 
five times higher than that of opposition combatants 
(57·3% vs 9·6%), and these wide-area weapons had 
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Figure 3: Civilian and civilian child deaths by governorate
No child deaths by air bombardment or shelling were recorded in Sweida. Governorates are written as listed in the Violation Documentation Center database.
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a severe impact on civilian children, accounting for 
79% (n=13 810) of direct deaths. Over the course of the 
conflict, the proportion of children among civilian deaths 
increased from 8·9% in 2011, to 19·0% in 2013, and 
reached 23·3% in 2016. Increased use of aerial bombing 
by Syrian Government forces and international partners 
was a likely contributor to this pattern and to our finding 
that the proportion of civilian women and children killed 
by explosive weapons increased earlier in this conflict, 
more rapidly and more severely than in civilian men, as 
aerial bombardments on densely populated areas in-
creased. Concentrated bombing on Aleppo increased child 
deaths disproportionately beyond that of any other govern -
orate. A possible contributor to increasing proportions of 
women and children among civilian deaths could be that 
numbers of civilian men in the population decreased over 
time as some took up arms to become combatants. 
Children are less likely to survive explosive blast injuries in 
armed conflict due to anatomical and physiological vulner-
abilities, and so might have contributed a greater pro-
portion to deaths by wide-area explosives.15,16 Among 
injured Syrians who fled to Turkey, head injuries from 
explosive weapons were more common in children17 and a 
post-mortem study found that 54% of Syrian children who 
died from bombing and shrapnel injuries had injuries to 
multiple body parts.18 An analysis of attacks on Syrian 
hospitals, which were primarily by aerial bombardment, 
found that most of the dead were male, but the highest 
case fatality was seen in children younger than 5 years.19
Among the explosive weapons used, the impact of barrel 
bombs on civilians, compared with their relatively small 
effect on combatants, was striking. Barrel bombs can 
cause three times as many injuries to survivors as do 
rockets and missiles, and cause higher numbers of 
deaths.11 They were dropped by Syrian Government forces 
on hospitals, markets, and homes.20 A first barrel bomb 
was sometimes followed by a second bomb dropped 
minutes later in a so-called double-tap strike to eliminate 
first responders and medical services.11 Our study shows 
that by the end of 2016, more than a quarter of all civilians 
killed by barrel bombs were children, with the highest 
numbers in Aleppo, Idlib, and Daraa. We found an 
extreme disparity from the use of barrel bombs in which 
nearly all barrel bomb deaths (97·1%) were civilians and 
only 2·8% of deaths were of opposition combatants. This 
excessive disparity between civilian and combatant deaths 
from wide-area explosives, and especially from barrel 
bombs, together with high rates of child deaths, are 
consistent with allegations that the Syrian Govern ment’s 
use of wide-area explosives was in violation of the Third 
and Fourth Geneva Conventions and Associated Protocols 
I & II that grant general civilian protection and special 
protection to children.5,21–23 The little effect on combatants 
and exceptionally disproportionate impact on civilians, 
especially on children, support assertions that barrel 
bombs were used indiscriminately, or that they constitute 
an indiscriminate weapon, contrary to international 
humanitarian law.23 An additional finding of extreme 
disparity was that among those killed by execution, 
92·4% were civilians compared with 7·6% who were 
opposition combatants. This finding is consistent with a 
deliberate tactic of terrorising civilians, also contrary to 
international humanitarian law.
Recruitment of Syrian youth and children into conflict-
related roles has been reported in 90% of surveyed 
subdistricts, with adolescent boys at particular risk.1 The 
recruitment or use in armed conflict of children under 
age 15 is a war crime and compulsory recruitment or 
direct participation in hostilities of children ages 15–17 is 
prohibited by international humanitarian law.24 Our data 
indicated that opposition child soldier deaths were 
primarily among boys in their late teens and as young as 
11 years of age. We do not know whether the children 
associated with opposition forces in the VDC dataset were 
actively recruited or volunteered, or whether they were in 
combat roles or other high-risk roles documented in Syria 
such as assisting emergency services and being porters or 
lookouts.25
Limitations of our study include that VDC data collection 
can vary over space and time due to intensity of conflict, 
changes in control of areas, blocked access, or threats to 
data collectors. Witnesses and families might decline to 
provide information due to fear of reprisal. Electricity and 
internet interruptions affect data communication.9,26,27 Data 
collection or cate gorisation can be biased by motivations 
of academic, government, or advocacy groups. These 
limitations are shared by studies using data from conflict 
areas. A limitation specific to our study is that we did not 
compare direct deaths of combatants on opposing sides. 
We did not include data from government-controlled areas 
because we considered data reporting in these areas to be 
more limited by the difficulty of obtaining data, as was 
considered likely for data gathered in government-
controlled areas for a study of attacks on hospitals.19 This 
study does not describe indirect deaths from this war, 
injuries, deaths of civilians taking refuge in other countries, 
disappeared persons, and detainees not recorded as killed 
such as concealed deaths by execution during government 
detention. Regarding the relative effects of weapons, we 
expect that deaths from wide-area explosive weapons were 
more likely to be under-recorded by the VDC than were 
deaths from shooting and executions because explosive 
forces are more likely to cause dismemberment and 
vaporisation of bodies, as well as bodies hidden by 
collapsed buildings. Thus, our findings of dis pro-
portionately high numbers of civilian deaths from wide-
area explosives weapons might be an underestimate. 
However, we do not believe that such an underestimate 
would change our finding of a disproportionate effect on 
civilians compared with combatants in this war.
Strengths of this study include the minimisation of 
recall bias and possibility of verification afforded by the 
VDC’s use of daily collated, detailed data. The VDC uses 
international standards for documentation of human 
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rights violations and has been recognised as a sound, 
detailed data source on Syrian conflict-related violent 
deaths over 6 years of the war.26,27 The dataset distinguishes 
between civilians and combatants, which allows analysis 
for variable effects of different weapons and tactics on 
civilians compared with combatants. In addition, causes 
of death of child soldiers can be compared with child 
civilians and adult combatants. Data on geographic 
locations and times of deaths can be combined with 
victim and weapon characteristics to identify trends and 
patterns of violent deaths in the Syrian conflict.
In conclusion, Syrian civilians, and in particular 
children, have borne the brunt of violence by parties to 
the Syrian civil war. Aerial bombing and shelling rapidly 
became primary causes of direct deaths of women and 
children. Increased reliance on aerial bombing by the 
Syrian Government and international partners probably 
contributed to our findings that children were killed in 
increasing proportions over time. Our findings 
underscore the poor efficacy of shelling and aerial bom-
bardments against combatants, and the dispro portionate 
lethal impact on civilians. These findings call into 
question the use of wide-area weapons in populated 
urban areas and suggest possible indiscriminate weapons 
use contrary to international humanitarian law. The 
extreme disparity found between numbers of deaths of 
civilians compared with combatants from barrel bombs is 
consistent with direct targeting of civilians, which would 
be a violation of international humanitarian law and 
might constitute a war crime.
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